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Post-September 11th 2001, academic attention on ‘Islamic’ terrorism is 
increasingly concentrating upon national and global security, political instability 
within majority-Muslim nation-states and perceived civilizational conflict 
between religio-cultural entities. Attempts to explain contemporary ‘Islamic’ 
terrorism within social science have tended to focus upon processes associated 
with increasing globalization and interlinked forms of cultural, economic, political 
and social changes. Clearly these are important, but many predate the emergence 
of the terror groups under investigation, failing to account for the prominent role 
of relatively highly educated and wealthy members. Underlying these accounts is 
an assumption that the rectification of poverty, introduction of democracy, 
universal education and improved proactive security arrangements will eradicate 
terrorism. However, the measures being implemented by national and 
international actors to improve security and address militancy and terrorism are 
contributing to an amplification of the beliefs and behaviour they are seeking to 
prevent and change. In other words, recent terrorism is in part an unintended 
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consequence of intentionally preventative measures. 
 
This paper focuses on the impact of anti-terror measures on identity formation and 
in particular the relationship between such measures and the development of al-
Qa’ida and associated groups. The impact of government policies designed to 
undermine the appeal of militant Islam within nation-states and actions 
undertaken in association with the American-led war on terror are assessed. The 
sociological concept of the ‘unintended consequences’ of intentional action is 
invoked here to help identify the social processes underlying recent terrorist 
activity. These processes are contributing to the ongoing creation and 














Contrary to popular belief and a not insignificant number of academic studies, 1 
individuals involved in terrorism2 are not inevitably poor, uneducated, 
unemployed or socially and economically dislocated.  This is evident in the 
involvement of intellectuals, the relatively wealthy, non-threatened, highly skilled 
and educationally successful people in religious, secular, nationalist and 
transnational terrorist groups and networks.  Rather than being driven by simple 
individualist or material motivations, group members’ involvement has often been 
the result of unplanned encounters and experiences.  In this paper the focus is 
upon trans-national groups associated with the Islamically oriented terrorist 
network of al-Qa’ida.3  Briefly, our argument is that the unintended consequences 
of certain nation-state policies and actions to reduce terrorism have actually 
contributed to the processes through which many people are becoming militant 
Muslims.  
 
However, unlike earlier labelling perspectives, which suggested that social control 
measures ironically produce their own deviance, the paper argues for a careful 
dissection of particular policy positions and their impacts in order to avoid 
empirically unsustainable conclusions regarding the role of social control 
measures in society. Although it can be demonstrated that some social control 
measures have led to contradictory outcomes, this is by no means inevitable, nor 
is it the case that similar social controls will produce the same outcomes across 
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different societies.  Our broad argument is that building towards a general 
sociological perspective on social control is best achieved by investigating 
particular cases with a view to comparing and contrasting the findings from these. 
This strategy should help to avoid overgeneralising from a weak evidence base 
and, hopefully, will lead to a better-balanced understanding of the role of social 
control measures within societies. In this paper, our specific attention will be 
focused on the demonstrable impacts of certain policy positions and state 
activities upon processes of identity formation, which underpin the movement of 
people into Islamic militant networks. This means that we will be looking for 
those policies and activities that can be shown to have unintentionally contributed 
to the strengthening of the militant groups they were meant to undermine.  
 
 
The Scale and Scope of Unintended Consequences in Human Affairs 
 
The concept of ‘unintended consequences’ has a long history in social science 
research, dating back to the eighteenth century European physiocrats, 
philosophers and economists (van Krieken 1998: 51). From Adam Smith’s 
version, based on his discovery of the so-called ‘hidden hand of the market’, to 
Robert Merton’s discussion of self-fulfilling and self-defeating prophecies, social 
scientists have been aware of some of the ironies and paradoxes of social 
processes. Nonetheless, much of the deliberation around the concept has centred 
on how we could better organise societies to avoid unintended consequences or at 
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least be better able to deal with them when they do arise. Merton (1967: 436) is a 
good example here, arguing that, ‘The self-fulfilling prophecy, whereby fears are 
translated into reality, operates only in the absence of deliberate institutional 
controls’. The suggestion is clear, that with better institutional controls, self-
fulfilling and defeating prophecies can be reduced or eliminated. But what if 
unintended consequences are more sociologically significant than such an 
optimistic conclusion suggests?  
 
Norbert Elias argues that unintended consequences, unplanned social 
development and ‘blind’ social processes are in fact not unusual or exotic events, 
but essential and inescapable features of social life as such. In his own work on 
civilizing and decivilizing processes, Elias (2000: 367) explains that the process 
of civilization is,  
 
not “reasonable”; not “rational”, any more than it is “irrational.” It is set in 
motion blindly and kept in motion by the autonomous dynamics of a web 
of relationships, by specific changes in the way people are bound to live 
together.   
 
Nevertheless, Elias (1978: 146) argues that, ‘Though it is unplanned and not 
immediately controllable, the overall process of development of a society is not in 
the least incomprehensible.  There are no ‘mysterious’ social forces behind it’. 
What Elias means here is that what in the past have been described somewhat 
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mysteriously as ‘social forces’, are nothing other than the pressures and 
compulsions produced by the interaction of interdependent social groups, social 
movements, nation-states and individuals, all of which ‘act’ in intentional ways 
without any one of them being able to control the overall situation produced by 
them. Sometimes these actions produce the desired outcomes, sometimes not. But 
the overall pattern of social life produced by the interweaving of all of these 
remains largely unplanned. The dynamic of social group relations generates an 
order that is not under the control of any group or state, though of course, this 
does not mean that it is beyond understanding or explanation. Therefore, in 
Elias’s perspective, the phenomenon of unintended consequences is not a 
marginal one in the analysis of societies, but potentially takes us to the very heart 
of social life and social scientific knowledge.  
 
Indeed, all sociological research should be alert to unintended consequences and 
this requires the tracing of intentional actions on a variety of levels. It also needs 
to follow the consequences of such actions. Of course, recently identified 
globalization processes add an extra dimension to the phenomenon of unintended 
consequences, making the tracing of the ripples from intentional actions much 
more complex. Decisions and actions taken in one part of the human world may 
have effects in geographically dispersed locations, which makes understanding 
the global level of human activity increasingly vital in social scientific work. 
Once we accept that unintended consequences are an active part of the warp and 
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weft of social life and social change, then we can stop viewing them as interesting 
but unusual events and start analysing their active role in the shaping of societies.   
 
With this theoretical backdrop in mind, the paper now explores the unintended 
outcomes of some of the most powerful actors in social life, namely national state 
governments. We do this in relation to the rise of terrorist activity in recent years, 
particularly that claimed as ‘Islamic’4 in orientation by the perpetrators. We will 
argue that focusing on unintended consequences not only helps to explain the 
failure of certain states to eliminate or dilute the influence of militancy in their 
societies, but also helps to understand how some, but not all, state policies have 
produced self-defeating outcomes.  
 
 
State-Sponsored Offensives, With and Against Militants 
 
A range of state policies has been introduced to strengthen support for 
governments and to weaken or destroy Islamic militancy.  One of the most widely 
used encourages particular forms of religious adherence in order to generate 
legitimacy for political regimes. Governments across Muslim societies have 
sought to utilise Islam to provide religious credibility for state policies and to 
emphasise the religiosity of regimes, whilst undermining the appeal of militancy 
and counteracting support for other discourses such as socialism and Arab 
nationalism (Abuza 2003, Gerges 2005, Vertigans 2003, Volpi 2003).  Even the 
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most secular regimes, such as those in Turkey and Tunisia, have supported a large 
increase in the number of mosques and enhanced the religious content within 
school curricula as well as increasing the number of religious schools including 
imam-hatips and medressas.  The growth of such schools has led many 
commentators to draw explicit links between religious schools and the rise in 
militancy and ultimately, terrorism.  Such institutions are blamed for spreading 
radical ideas and recruiting younger militants.  Particular attention has been 
focused on the emphasis upon radical concepts such as jihad within school 
curricula and textbooks (Byman and Green 1999; Kepel 2004; Rahman 1998; 
Stern 2003). Pakistan is one of the most prominent nation-states where the 
tremendous growth in religious schools is associated with thousands of medressa 
graduates who have subsequently joined militant training camps before leaving to 
fight for localised issues or to join international terrorist networks and groups.   
 
However, there is a danger that the general role of religious schools is being 
overstated, with little evidence to support the widespread explicit role of 
educational institutions in drawing people into terrorist activity. Whilst these 
institutions are not causally responsible for the increase in numbers of people 
joining terror groups, they are intentionally contributing to greater levels of 
individual piety and, unintentionally, to greater levels of militancy and anti-
Western ideologies.  Paz (2003: 58) argues that this ‘Islamic atmosphere’ 
provides a greenhouse effect, ‘for violent groups as well as the preservation of 
worldviews where hostility towards the West or Western culture dominates’. 
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These conflicting concepts and challenging ideologies have become immersed 
and frequently adapted or accepted, within many local cultures.  
 
The use of religious groups and ideology can also be seen within the military 
strategies of nation-states.  Militant Islamic groups have been supported by 
various governments to covertly undertake military activities on their behalf.  For 
example, in Indonesia militants have been used to fight communists and national 
separatists, Pakistan uses mujahideen (mainly schooled in medrassas) to fight the 
proxy war with India over Kashmir (Stern 2003) and the Turkish armed forces 
had strong links with Hizbollah, (which was distinct from the Lebanese 
organization) which undertook attacks against Kurds (Vertigans 2003).  These 
groups have been schooled in militant ideologies and trained in military tactics 
and provided with resources. Such training and resources have subsequently and 
unintentionally contributed to Islamic groups acting within and often against the 
sponsoring nation-states.  Other pragmatic factors must also be taken into account 
when explaining the growth of militant Islam.  These include the increase in 
organisational, financial, intellectual and technical resources allied to 
technological and weaponry advancements, which have provided terrorists with 
the means, skills, experience and capability to build support and oppose nation-
states within global relationships. All of these factors have combined to provide 
terror groups with growing support, legitimacy and opportunities. It must be 
stressed that, with some notable exceptions, generally nation-states have not 
intentionally sought to support Islamic terrorism.  But their actions and policies in 
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the areas of religion, education and internal social control measures have 
unintentionally contributed to raising levels of religiosity and increasing the 
popularity of a more radical religious discourse.  In circumstances which provide, 
at best, limited opportunities for political participation and socio-economic 
conditions which legitimise militant ideology, many people are internalising 
radical views to form or join terror groups. 
 
 
Terrorism in International Relations  
 
The unintended consequences of government actions are not restricted to internal 
attempts at controlling religion and other ideologies.  There have been a series of 
decisions made by nation-states that have contributed to the Islamic resurgence in 
general and militancy in particular within some national societies.  Examples 
include a mixture of American, Pakistani and Saudi training, military equipment, 
financial and logistical support, and in the latter two cases, recruits, for the 
Afghan mujahideen during their war against the Soviet Union (Burke 2003, 
Gerges 2005, Vertigans and Sutton 2001). Many Muslim governments saw the 
war in Afghanistan (1979-89) as an opportunity both to show their own Islamic 
credentials, by providing support and to resolve the problem of internal radical 
dissent with many militants leaving to fight the Soviet Union.  The implications of 
support for the Afghan mujahideen did not become apparent until long after the 
Soviet Union had been defeated.  It is important to distinguish between the groups 
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involved in the war against the Soviet Union and those that became part of global 
terrorist networks.  As Sageman (2004) has identified, the pre-1989 fighters in 
Afghanistan supported a traditional jihad based on defensive commitments that 
were in support of Muslim lands and lost territories.  The adoption of the 
aggressive jihad by a minority of those who had been involved against the West 
in Afghanistan occurred during the 1990s, for a variety of reasons. The latter 
include the repression of important militant groups such as Islamic Jihad in Egypt, 
limited popular support for their religious doctrine which meant that popular 
coups against national governments were not feasible and growing levels of 
repulsion amongst Muslims to the high profile attacks on tourists and Muslims.  
This is exemplified by suspension of the armed struggle within Egypt by Islamic 
Jihad’s leader (and al-Qa’ida’s deputy), Ayman al-Zawahiri.  Gerges (2005: 129) 
suggests that the suspension showed the group was ‘no longer logistically capable 
of sustaining its confrontation with the regime.’  At a national level, this period 
marked a watershed as groups debated how to react to these setbacks.  Many 
militants across Muslim societies chose to suspend activities, changed their 
approach to proselytising or waited for opportunities to unfold, whilst some 
continued to target ‘near enemies.’  In a major shift in approach, some groups, 
largely comprising Afghan veterans associated with bin Laden and al-Zawahiri, 
adopted very different strategies based on aggressive jihad and internationalised 
conflict.5   
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Post-September 11th 2001, the role of American logistical and financial support 
for Afghan resistance during the war with the Soviet Union has attracted 
considerable attention.  However, it is important to avoid overstating the 
American contribution.  Certainly America was on the same side as people who 
were later to become significant within anti-American transnationalism.  But these 
Afghan veterans were foreign fighters known collectively as the ‘Arab Afghans’ 
who were not directly supported by the United States during the war.  By contrast, 
major participation in salafi jihad groups by native Afghans, who did receive 
American assistance, has been limited (Burke 2003; Sageman 2004).  
Consequently the popular ‘blowback’ thesis, which considers the 11 September 
attacks to be the unintended consequence of American support in the Afghan-
Soviet war, is only partially correct.  The development of global Islamic terrorism 
since 1989, and in particular from the mid 1990s, has meant that it is more 
accurate to say that salafi jihad groups ‘were an indirect consequence of U.S 
involvement’ (Sageman 2004: 56).  So instead of focusing on a single conflict, a 
range of different actions by the United States that has unintentionally 
strengthened the appeal of the militant ideology it sought to undermine, need to be 
identified.  Collectively, these activities have contributed to the overall 
unintended consequence that has seen America designated as the ‘far enemy’ by 
militant Muslims.   
 
In retaliation for the 1998 attacks on American embassies in East Africa, cruise 
missiles were fired at what were believed to be bin Laden’s premises 
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manufacturing chemical weapons.  As de Waal (2004: 226) remarks, the 
bombings were ‘technologically “smart” but politically dumb’, turning the attacks 
into a propaganda coup for the Islamist Sudanese government and beginning the 
process through which bin Laden became a lauded oppositional figure, appealing 
to other militant groups to become part of the al-Qa’ida alliance. Similarly, the 
initially exaggerated close association between bin Laden and Zarqawi in Iraq, as 
claimed by American Secretary of State, Colin Powell, amid claims that Zarqawi 
was a terrorist mastermind, actually provided Zarqawi with an endorsement for 
the militant movement that his actions at that stage had not justified (Brisard and 
Martinez 2005). Crucially, Powell’s views became a self-fulfilling prophecy as 
the previously anonymous Zarqawi became an international figure and a focal 
point for opposition in Iraq to unite around.  Conversely the decision to disband 
the Iraqi army created massive unemployment and led to many trained personnel 
joining the violent opposition. It also contributed to the state of lawlessness which 
has created the freedom for militant Islamists and Baathists to operate.  These 
factors have strengthened anti-American feeling, fed the appeal of militant Islam 
and provided groups associated with al-Qa’ida with contemporary ‘evidence’ 
which can be used to justify their violent terrorist campaign against the West.  
 
 
Policy-Making for Terrorism Control  
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Muslim societies, and more recently Western governments, have become 
increasingly aware of the threat that radical Islam, and terrorism in particular, is 
posing.  Nation-states have taken different approaches to suppress the religious 
opposition including authoritarian secularism in places like Turkey, Algeria, 
Egypt and Tunisia.  This approach tended to be ‘dual track’, aimed at repressing 
militants while promoting Islam as a means of social control designed to appeal to 
moderates.  It is a very difficult balancing act.  For example, in post-independent 
Central Asia, Islam was initially used as a component of national identity.  But 
when it became apparent that religion was becoming a powerful political 
ideology, both Uzbekistan and Tajikistan implemented repressive measures.  
These led to militant groups becoming particularly active against the nation-states 
(Esposito 2002).  North African and the Gulf states have also frequently sought to 
repress radical Islam through mass imprisonment while cultivating what is 
considered to be more moderate Islam.  These governments utilise religion to 
legitimise state policies and institutions and focus attention upon individual piety.   
 
However, moderate Muslims have often also been enmeshed within the blanket 
arrests of those Muslims seen as a threat to nation-states.  These innocent 
Muslims have been imprisoned alongside militant Muslims and often become 
radicalised due to their experiences.  For instance, following the cancellation of 
the 1992 elections in Algeria which the FIS (Front of Islamic Salvation) looked 
certain to win, the military clamped down on people associated with the party and 
ordinary members were arrested and interned in camps in the Sahara.  This action 
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‘transformed many thousands of activists into embittered outlaws at a stroke and 
helped ensure that the armed rebellion then gestating would be massive’ (ICG 
2004: 8).  To a lesser extent, legislation introduced and public reaction across 
Western nation-states following the 2001 attacks on America, have contributed to 
more restraint, scrutiny and suspicion of Muslims generally.  In turn many 
Muslims have reassessed their relationship with the wider societies: an outcome 
that is likely to have been hoped for within the terror groups’ strategic approach.   
 
Saddam Hussein also tried to utilise religion when in power, particularly post-
1991 when the consequences of the UN-imposed sanctions became apparent.  
Both Sunni and Shi’ite groups were encouraged. Sunni groups adopted similar 
arrangements to the Muslim Brotherhood in other parts of the Middle East and 
developed strong networks, providing public services to local communities.  To 
help offset the influence of Ayatollah Sistani, now believed to be the main 
influence behind the leading Shi’ite and coalition party, United Iraqi Alliance, the 
Shi’ite al-Sadr faction was also supported by the Iraqi government.6  Community 
groups were established, again providing services to local neighbourhoods, and 
mullahs became more noticeable and influential. Crowds at prayer sessions rose 
and gradually became more hostile to Saddam’s regime, ultimately leading to 
Sadiq al-Sadr, the leader following the death of Baqir, and two of his sons being 
killed by Saddam’s assassins in 1999 (Kepel 2004).  The last remaining son, 
Moktada, was to be subsequently instrumental in the Shi’ite uprising against the 
American invasion.    
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The dual track approach has a number of effects. It gives militants’ ideology 
greater significance and a higher profile than they might otherwise achieve and 
drives them underground where they use clandestine tactics. As such they are 
harder to detect. For example, in Egypt the threat posed by enhancing Islamic 
influence was belatedly realised by Sadat who clamped down on dissent and 
opponents’ activities. However, this contributed to opponents being forced 
underground, where their actions were harder to monitor and led to further anger 
and an escalation of actions. Terror groups that became al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya 
and al-Jihad were mobilised to take more radical action against the state, 
culminating in the assassination of Sadat in 1981 (al-Zayyat 2004, Gerges 2005, 
Milton-Edwards 2005).   
 
The policy of using Islam as a mechanism for social control and to weaken 
support for militancy contributes to undermining the ulema who are increasingly 
considered to be part of the establishment.  As Enhali and Adda (2003:2) explain, 
in respect to Algeria post independence but which can be applied many Muslim 
societies, ‘the ulema… were turned into civil servants who contributed to 
strengthening the state and following its policies.’  A breach has formed between 
considerable numbers of ulema and more radical groups and weakened the 
potential for broader Muslim challenges to nation-states.  In this respect, 
governments can be seen to be more secure but this outcome has also created 
space for militants to provide theological advice and religious edicts that they are 
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generally not qualified to make.  However it is this lack of institutionalisation that 
provides part of the legitimacy for people like bin Laden, Zawahiri and until his 
recent death, Zarqawi.  It should be stressed however that this does not apply to 
all ulema.  In Egypt, the secular regime’s frequent reliance upon the ulema to 
provide theological legitimacy for its policies has enabled some to promote more 
radical interpretations than would be otherwise anticipated with secular patronage.  
As Kepel (2004) points out, within Saudi Arabia, the Saudi regime’s growing 
reliance on religious institutions for social control has enabled the ulema to 
negotiate stricter enforcement of their perceptions of Islamic morality which has 
had a particularly restrictive impact on women.  Following the 1990 Iraqi invasion 
of Kuwait and subsequent stationing of American troops in Saudi Arabia (which 
contributed to the further radicalisation of bin Laden (Bergen 2001, Burke 2003, 
Saikal 2003) tremendous pressure was placed upon the relationship between the 
Saudi government and ulema.  The need for the ulema to sanction the 
government’s decision placed religious figures in a strong bargaining position that 
they used to secure greater Islamification of society in return for the supportive 
fatwa.  Subsequent indirect support, resources and freedom provided by the Saudi 
government have contributed to the growth of militancy and ultimately 
international terrorism that the regime has struggled to contain.    
 
In a different way, the American-led invasion of Iraq in support of ‘freedom’ and 
‘democracy’ and the subsequent military control has also produced the reported 
humiliation and degradation of Iraqi prisoners and the death of thousands of 
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civilians.  Some of the most prominent images of the ‘war on terrorism’ have been 
the incarceration without trial of Muslims, the denial of human rights at the 
Guantanamo detention centre, destruction of houses, killing of civilians and the 
abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison.  These actions and images have had two 
significant outcomes.  Firstly, they have undermined the appeal of the values that 
America sought to promote.  Secondly, legitimacy for terrorism has been 
strengthened, as militants have been able to justify their attacks with reference to 
American actions and policies.   
 
 
Globalisation of ‘Islamic’ Terrorism  
 
Contrary to widespread opinion (Robertson 1992, Waters 1998), which suggests 
that radical Muslim organisations are opposed to globalisation, many groups have 
utilised modern forms of transport and information communications technologies 
(ICT) (Turner 1994). Indeed, it could be argued that al-Qa’ida and related groups’ 
international focus and strategic approach would be impossible without 
contemporary media, particularly uncensored satellite television, Internet and 
mobile communications (Bunt 2003, Kurzman 2002; Sutton and Vertigans 2005).  
Images and information are being transmitted about incidents and policies at a 
much faster rate, quickly raising levels of awareness among Muslims about 
international affairs (Aouragh 2003, Burke 2006, Sakr 2001). The often graphic 
and disturbing representations help to arouse anger at the perceived instigators 
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and mobilise opposition against those held responsible, such as Israel in the case 
of Lebanese and Palestinian nationalists and secular Muslim regimes or Western 
nation-states or institutions for other militant nationalist and transnational groups.   
 
Islamic terror groups’ ideologies and approaches to conflict have become 
globalised.  Certainly some groups remain loyal to local and national concerns, 
such as Hamas and Hizbollah, which are predominantly linked to Palestinian and 
Lebanese issues respectively. Some groups in South Asia also remain dedicated to 
national struggles, though their actions can also be interpreted within the wider 
agenda of al-Qa’ida.  Groups associated with al-Qa’ida are very much the product 
of transnational influences.  Al-Qa’ida’s brand of jihadi salafism is a fusion of 
different international, theological influences that incorporates Wahhabism from 
Saudi Arabia, Qutbism from Egypt and Deobandis from the Indian sub continent, 
with local variations in beliefs and behaviour.  The development of contemporary 
terrorism has also been influenced by ideological transformations following the 
Iranian revolution, the expropriation of the military victory in Afghanistan for 
militant Islam and the ultimate success of Hizbollah’s terror campaign against the 
Israeli army in Lebanon. Different events contributed to a growing confidence in 
the ability of militant Islam to tackle opposing ideologies and institutions.  Until 
recently, conflict has been maintained or facilitated by veteran Afghan 
mujahideen who remained instrumental within different groups associated with al-
Qa’ida.7   
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There has been an increasing perception of a global challenge provided by these 
groups that crosscuts international barriers.  Ideologically the groups are far from 
united and disagree about the emphasis to be placed upon attacking Muslim and / 
or Western targets.  Generally there is a shared perception that Muslim nation-
states (the “near enemy”) have to be changed and the West, in particular the 
United States (the “far enemy”), has to be confronted by groups associated with 
al-Qa’ida.  Consequently the strategic approach has broadened.8  This can be 
witnessed in the attacks on Western targets by indigenous peoples and other 
nationalities and by migrants who have been radicalised by their experiences in 
the West, exposure to militant ideologies in mosques, universities and through 
friends and who have witnessed the unintended consequences of Muslims and 
Western nation-states’ actions via the mass media (Bennett 2004, Burke 2003, 
Sutton and Vertigans 2005). The threat to these nation-states is obviously very 
real and is readily promoted when seeking to justify the increasingly repressive 
actions and restrictions of individual liberties. However, there are questions 
regarding the extent to which government concerns unintentionally contribute to 
strengthening perceptions of the notoriety and capability of the terror groups, 
which in turn adds to their profile and hence appeal amongst some Muslims.   
 
 
Concluding Comments  
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Terrorist groups associated with al-Qa’ida have been influenced by a series of 
factors. These include economic exclusion and cultural dislocation, identified in 
other studies.  However these factors predate contemporary Islamic terrorism and 
therefore cannot provide a sufficient explanation.  In many ways al-Qa’ida and 
related groups can be seen as a reaction to, and consequence of, Western and 
secular actions that have unintentionally heightened economic inequalities, 
cultural concerns, perceived political injustices and conflicts.  The role of counter-
terrorism measures within nation-states alongside the international ‘war on terror’, 
have unintentionally contributed to the phenomena they are seeking to destroy, 
with local conditions and global events helping to legitimise acts of terror and 
attract support.     
 
Different approaches have been adopted to make use of, control and repress 
militant Islam, which have contributed both to the broad Islamic resurgence and 
support for terrorist organisations.  Repression, weak civil societies and restricted 
levels of political participation within many Muslim societies have resulted in 
very limited opportunities for societal debate, discussions and the airing of 
disagreements.  It is therefore easy with hindsight to attribute blame and criticise 
the inability of nation-states to consider the potential longer-term unintended 
consequences of their policies and actions.  In turn, this has resulted in 
oppositional groups feeling that Islamic networks and militant approaches are the 
only viable methods for mobilising.  However, as argued above, this criticism 
should be tempered by the recognition that, not only governments and their 
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advisers, but also social scientific knowledge more generally, has not reached 
such high levels of predictive power. Once the phenomenon of the unintended 
consequences of intentional activity is recognised in its widest sociological sense, 
as operative at all levels of social relations including the global, then sociological 
work not only becomes more complex, but over the longer-term perhaps more 
reality congruent and potentially useful. In the short-term, the underlying political, 
economic, cultural and social factors behind the appeal of terrorism and the 
penetration of militancy across both Muslim majority and minority nation-states 
suggest that it will be much harder to address the problems these actions have 
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1 For example: Ayubi (1991), Butko (2004), Mortimer (1982), Roy (1994). 
2  The use of terrorism to describe acts of political violence is also contentious.  
There is no universal agreement on what terrorism means, highlighted by 
Schmid’s (1993) study of over 100 definitions.  Schmid concluded that none of 
the examined definitions were acceptable to the range of interested parties.  But 
while acknowledging the inherent difficulties in using a definition it is important 
to establish the range of behaviour that is being described.  In this paper terrorism 
is defined as the targeted and intentional use of violence for political purposes 
(Vertigans 2006).  This definition can be applied to both non-governmental and 
governmental actions, although in this paper there is a concentration upon the 
former.   
3 ‘Groups associated with al-Qa’ida’ refers to collections of people who are either 
part of al-Qa’ida or belong to groups that are part of a loose association who share 
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some similar ideological interpretations, aims and tactics (Sutton and Vertigans 
2005).  Burke (2006: 175) suggests that many groups are ‘neither part of a single 
global jihad… nor dedicated merely to a local group, but… a hybrid of the two.’   
4 The extent to which the groups can legitimately be described as Islamic is the 
source of considerable debate. The groups’ discourse and actions are widely 
considered to be against religious teachings.  However the famous W.I. Thomas 
(1928) adage is adopted, that if people think something is real then it is real in its 
consequences.  From this perspective, if the attackers think they are Muslims, then 
we argue it is not the responsibility of social scientists to prove otherwise 
5 Gerges (2005) points out that this decision further fragmented Islamic militancy 
between those wanting to instigate global jihad and groups concentrating on 
national insurgence. 
6 The relationship was always tense, not least because Saddam had arranged the 
assassination of the earlier leader Baqir al-Sadr in 1980. 
7 Since 2001, a range of attacks on Western targets have been undertaken by 
groups in Pakistan, Jordan, Kuwait, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Spain and Britain with 
little or no direct identifiable links to the al-Qa’ida hardcore.  These attacks 
indicate that autonomous terror cells are adopting concepts, ideas and techniques 
in the style of al-Qa’ida without necessarily being part of the group (Burke 2003, 
Sutton and Vertigans 2006). 
8 Despite the broadening of strategic focus, individuals and groups associated with 
al-Qa’ida retain interests in the countries of their origins.  For example, 
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publications by both bin Laden (quoted verbatim in Lawrence 2005) and al-
Zawahiri (2001) tend to place disproportionately greater attention upon events in 
Saudi Arabia and Egypt respectively.  
